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Susan B. Heyman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following sequence of events. Paul Somers is a 
Vice President of Portfolio Management at Digital Realty Trust, 
Inc. (“Digital Realty”), a real estate investment trust that owns, 
develops, and manages technology to make real estate transactions 
more efficient.1 While working in Singapore, he reported to Kris 
Kumar, a Senior Vice President, who developed the Asian Pacific 
Region for Digital Realty.2 Somers believed that Kumar had 
committed a number of securities violations, including hiding 
millions of dollars in cost overruns on a Hong Kong development.3 
He also believed Kumar eliminated certain internal controls in 
violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act).4 
 
 
* Professor of Law at Roger Williams University School of Law. 
1. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 
2015), aff’d, 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id.; see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
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Rather than ignoring these suspicions of misconduct, Somers 
reported his concerns to Digital Realty’s officers, directors, and/or 
managing agents.5 It is undisputed that Somers never reported his 
concerns of misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).6 Shortly after making these internal reports, and despite 
his record of superior achievements, Somers was terminated from 
Digital Realty.7 
Somers brought various claims against Digital Realty in 
federal court for his allegedly wrongful termination, including a 
whistleblower retaliation claim under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act).8 
Digital Realty moved to dismiss the retaliation claim arguing that 
Somers could not seek protection under the Dodd-Frank Act 
because he did not report the alleged violations to the SEC.9 The 
district court denied the motion finding that the Dodd-Frank Act 
“does not necessitate recourse to the SEC prior to gaining 
‘whistleblower’ status . . . .”10 Finding the term “whistleblower” 
ambiguous, the court applied the doctrine established in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., and 
accorded deference to the SEC’s definition of whistleblower.11 The 
SEC interpreted the term whistleblower expansively to include 
employees who internally report to their supervisors without also 
reporting to the SEC.12 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.13 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision holding 
that Chevron deference should not be given to the SEC 
 
 
5. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1092. 
6. See Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, 
Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., No. 14-CV-05180-EMC, 2015 WL 13677868 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2015). 
7. Complaint at 3, Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (No. 3:14 CV-05180). 
8. Id. at 8–9. In addition to the whistleblower retaliation claim, Somers 
brought claims for disparate treatment and retaliation under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, 
breach of contract, and defamation. See id. 
9. Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1091–92. 
10. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018) (citing 
Somers, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1095–96). 
11. Id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984)). 
12. Id. For a discussion of the SEC rule, see infra section I.B. 
13. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), 
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018). 
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interpretation.14 Under a textualist approach, the Court concluded 
that the plain language of the statute narrowly defined 
“whistleblower” to include only individuals who report their 
suspicions of misconduct directly to the SEC.15 
Most whistleblowers report internally to their superiors, as 
Somers did, and many never reveal their suspicions of misconduct 
to the SEC.16 These internal reporters can no longer bring claims 
in federal court under the Dodd-Frank Act and will instead have to 
file administrative complaints as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, or in state court under various state statutes or common law. 
Consequently, the case of Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers 
is likely to have a significant impact on corporate compliance 
programs.17 Limiting whistleblower status under the Dodd-Frank 
Act undermines the protections available to attorneys and others 
who have mandatory reporting obligations but may be limited by 
state ethics rules from disclosing externally to the SEC. Further, 
employees and others who do not have mandatory reporting 
obligations may bypass corporate internal reporting protocols and 
report directly to the SEC. Although the Digital Realty Court 
suggested that Congress intended this result, it may have some 
unintended consequences, such as delaying corrective action, 
curtailing internal investigations, and draining government 
resources. Without protection under the Dodd-Frank Act, some 
employees may decide not to report suspicions of wrongdoing in 
order to retain their jobs and preserve their reputations.18 
Retaliatory measures can have devastating emotional and financial 
effects on whistleblowers and their families, which create a huge 
disincentive to reporting.19 
 
14. Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 781–82. 
15. See id. at 776. 
16. Jennifer M. Pacella, Conflicted Counselors: Retaliation Protections, 33 
YALE J. ON REG. 491, 493 (2016) (citing a survey of the Ethics Resource Center 
finding that only two percent of employee-whistleblowers reported externally 
without also reporting internally). 
17. See infra section II for a discussion of how the narrow definition may 
impact compliance programs. 
18. Christina Pellino, Don’t Whistle While You Work – Unless You Whistle 
to the SEC, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 911, 912 (2015) (discussing how deference 
should be given to the SEC’s interpretation of “whistleblower”). 
19. Pacella, supra note 16, at 493. In addition to being terminated from 
employment, whistleblowers may be blacklisted from entire industries, or 
ostracized and alienated from colleagues and friends. See id. 
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This Survey is intended to provide a summary of the Digital 
Realty case and discuss some of the consequences of the Court’s 
narrow definition of whistleblower. Part I will discuss various 
protections offered to whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, and various state statutes, and will 
discuss the Digital Realty decision. Then, Part II will discuss the 
impact that the decision may have on corporate compliance 
programs and some of the unintended consequences that may result 
from the Court’s narrow interpretation. Finally, Part III will 
discuss how the Court’s refusal to afford Chevron deference to the 
SEC interpretation may be a sign of the Court’s willingness to 
reconsider the doctrine under the right circumstances. 
I. SUPREME COURT ADOPTS NARROW DEFINITION OF 
WHISTLEBLOWER 
A. Whistleblower Protection Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and State Statutes 
There are three sources of whistleblower protection: state 
statutes, common law wrongful discharge claims, and federal 
statutes (including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank 
Act). 
1. State Statutes and Common Law 
Traditionally most jurisdictions strictly adhered to the 
employment at-will doctrine, meaning that employers could 
terminate employees, and employees could resign, for any reason or 
for no reason at all.20 As common law developed, some states 
adopted public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine and 
restricted the ability of employers to terminate employees for 
certain reasons, such as refusing to violate the law or reporting 
such a violation.21 Other courts began recognizing causes of action 
 
20. HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 
§ 133, at 272 (2d ed. Albany, N.Y., John D. Parsons, Jr. 1886). 
21. See, e.g., Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387, 389 
(Conn. 1980). 
It would be difficult to maintain that the right to discharge an 
employee hired at will is so fundamentally different from other 
contract rights that its exercise is never subject to judicial scrutiny 
regardless of how outrageous, how violative of public policy, the 
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for retaliatory discharge by implying a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing into the employment relationship.22 In these tort actions, 
aggrieved employees were often awarded punitive damages for the 
employer’s egregious conduct.23 While most states afford some 
protection to whistleblowers, such protection is not adequate as 
employees are often required to identify a well-established law that 
is being violated in order to receive protection.24 
In an attempt to provide additional protection, each state has 
adopted some form of whistleblower statute that protects 
employees from retaliation.25 These laws were all passed with the 
same objective—”to expose, deter, and curtail wrongdoing.”26 
However, the requirements that reporters must meet in order to be 
protected vary considerably.27 Whether an employee is entitled to 
bring a claim often depends on the applicable state law. For 
instance, some statutes only protect external reporters,28 some only 
protect certain classes of employees,29 some only protect employees 
 
 
employer’s conduct may be ........... [P]ublic policy imposes some limits 
on unbridled discretion to terminate the employment of someone hired 
at will. 
Id. at 387. 
22. Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 400 (Del. 2000) (citing E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 442–44 (Del. 1996)) (“Delaware law 
has evolved, however, through recognition of a limited implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing as an exception to the harshness of the employment at- 
will doctrine.”). 
23. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Discharge of At Will 
Employees, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 449, 453 (1985) (analyzing the public policy 
of awarding punitive damages for wrongful discharge claims). 
24. See, e.g., Bohatch v. Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543, 543 (Tex. 1998) (holding 
that a law firm partner could be expelled from the partnership for accusing 
another partner of overbilling without exposing the partnership to a tort 
claim). 
25. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State 
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L. J. 99, 108 (2000). 
26. Id. at 100. 
27. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, 
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for 
Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, at App. A (2004) (providing 
summaries of each state’s whistleblower statute and listing relevant case law 
from each jurisdiction). 
28. A few states only provide protection to employees who report 
misconduct to public bodies or to public officers with authority to act. See 
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 25, at App. A. 
29. Twenty-three states offer general protection to both private and public 
employees, while twenty-four states provide general protection to only public 
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after making a good faith attempt to determine accuracy of the 
report,30 and some only protect reports of certain types of activity.31 
Further, the remedies available to aggrieved employees vary 
considerably.32 Accordingly, state whistleblower protection has 
been described by several scholars as “murky, piecemeal, [and] 
disorganized.”33 
To highlight the disparate treatment of whistleblowers under 
state law, consider two prominent and respected whistleblowers: 
Sherron Watkins, Enron’s Chief Financial Officer, and Cynthia 
Cooper, the head of internal auditing at WorldCom.34 Each of these 
women played instrumental roles in exposing widespread 
corruption at corporations by raising concerns of accounting fraud 
to high-level executives. Neither of these employees reported their 
suspicions to a government agency. While there is no principled 
distinction in their respective situations, Cooper’s whistleblowing 
would have been protected under Mississippi law,35 while Watkins’ 
whistleblowing would not have been protected under Texas law.36 
Neither Texas nor Mississippi have adopted broad whistleblower 
 
employees. See Cherry, supra note 27, at App. A. 
30. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 25, at 121 (explaining that Ohio 
only protects employees who make reasonable and good faith efforts to confirm 
accuracy of report before disclosure). 
31. For example, the New York statute only provides protection to 
employees who report concerns relating to “a substantial and specific danger 
to the public health or safety.” See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2002). 
New York courts interpreting this statute have held that financial fraud is not 
a danger to the public welfare and reporters of such misconduct are not 
protected under the statute. See Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y., 
152 A.D.2d 169, 180–81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that an employee who 
reported suspicions of fraudulent loan practices as not protected by the 
statute). 
32. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 25, at 129–30 (explaining that the 
majority of courts have not allowed punitive damages under the relevant 
whistleblower statute and a few courts have not allowed actual damages in the 
absence of express statutory language). 
33. Cherry, supra note 27, at 1049. 
34. Id. at 1035, 1039. 
35. McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 604 (Miss. 1993) 
(holding that “employee was not barred [by the employment at will doctrine] 
from [bringing] tort actions for damages if employee refused to participate in 
illegal act or if employee was discharged for reporting illegal acts of employer 
to employer or anyone else”). 
36. Austin v. Health Trust, Inc., 967 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1998) (holding 
that “Texas does not recognize common law cause of action for retaliatory 
discharge of employee who reports illegal activities of others in workplace”). 
 84 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:78 
 
statutes to protect private employees such as Watkins and 
Cooper.37 However, the Mississippi Supreme Court created a 
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that 
restricts an employer from retaliating against an employee 
whistleblower.38 To the contrary, Texas has not provided for such 
a general common law exception.39 
2. Federal Statutes 
The federal protection available to whistleblowers before the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has also been described as “piecemeal.”40 
Federal whistleblower protection originated in the Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), which extended whistleblower 
protection to federal employees “who disclose government illegality, 
waste, and corruption.”41 This protection was seen as a necessary 
step toward achieving a more effective civil service.42 A decade 
later, Congress passed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 
(WPA), which established a private cause of action for federal 
government employees.43 The stated purpose of the WPA was to 
“strengthen and improve protection for the rights of Federal 
employees, to prevent reprisals, and to help eliminate wrongdoing 
within the Government.”44 Many scholars have commented that 
the CSRA and WPA provide “illusory legal protections” and are 
 
37. The public employee whistleblower statute would not have protected 
Watkins. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 554.001 (West 1994). Nor would 
the  area  specific  whistleblower  statutes.   See,  e.g.,  TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. 
§ 125.013 (West 1995) (protecting reporters of agricultural hazards); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 261.110 (West 2002) (protecting reporters of child abuse and 
neglect). 
38. McArn, 626 So. 2d at 607. 
39. City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 210, 216 (Tex. 2000) 
(refusing “to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing on employers in light 
of the variety of statutes that the Legislature has already enacted to regulate 
employment relationships”). But see Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 
795 S.W.2d 723, 723–25 (Tex. 1990) (creating a narrow exception to the 
employment at will doctrine, which requires a plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the discharge was based only on the 
plaintiff’s refusal to perform an illegal act). 
40. Cherry, supra note 27, at 1049. 
41. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 
(codified as amended at various sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
42. S. Rep. 95-969 (1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2746). 
43. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat 16 (codified in various sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
44. Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 
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ineffective. Further, these statutes only extend protection to 
federal employees. 
Many other federal statutes include whistleblower protections 
for specific types of disclosures.45 Accordingly, a whistleblower 
would be protected if he or she reported a violation of a federal 
statute that included an anti-retaliation provision.46 For example, 
if an employee reported an unfair labor practice violation, he or she 
would be protected under federal law.47 On the other hand, if an 
employee reported a different type of violation, which did not 
include a retaliation provision, he or she would not be protected. 
However, this stark distinction has been relaxed by recent Supreme 
Court decisions. For example, the Court has held that several anti- 
discrimination statutes, including Title IX, that do not expressly 
provide for anti-retaliation claims afford an implied cause of action 
for retaliation and, therefore, provide federal whistleblower 
protection.48 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to the 
corporate and accounting scandals at the turn of the century. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was intended to promote corporate 
accountability, protect investors, and protect employees who report 
misconduct.49 It ameliorates some of the uneven treatment of 
whistleblowers under various federal statutes, state statutes, and 
common law exceptions to the traditional at-will doctrine.50 
 
45. See Robert McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal 
Whistleblowers, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 186 n.10 (2012). 
46. For a summary of the federal statutes that include whistleblower 
protections, see Cherry, supra note 27, at App. B. 
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2000). 
48. See Kasteu v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics, 563 U.S. 1, 4 (2011) 
(ruling that the anti-retaliation provision of the Federal Fair Labor Standards 
Act prohibits retaliation against employees who file complaints, including oral 
complaints); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 477 (2007) (extending 
whistleblower protection to employees who assert claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 
U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (extending whistleblower protection to employee who 
protested the discrimination of a girls basketball team under Title IX of the 
Civil Rights Act). 
49. Several scholars have questioned the ultimate impact of the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act, as it makes “no direct effort to exhort, encourage or command 
superior accounting or corporate governance.” Lawrence Cunningham, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 
35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 920 (2003). 
50. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012). 
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Specifically, section 806 provides protections for employees of 
publicly traded companies who report fraud internally to a person 
with supervisory authority, to a member of Congress, or to a 
government agency, such as the SEC.51 
Despite this seemingly broad protection offered to employees of 
publicly traded corporations, the Act imposes significant 
restrictions on employee suits. For example, before commencing a 
private cause of action, the Act requires an employee to exhaust all 
administrative remedies by filing with the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA).52 Such a complaint must be filed 
within 180 days of the date of the violation or the date on which the 
employee became aware of the violation.53 The employee may only 
bring an action in federal court if OSHA does not issue a final 
decision within 180 days of the filing of the complaint and the delay 
is not attributable to the bad faith of the employee.54 
Another limitation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is that the 
remedy available to an aggrieved employee is compensatory—the 
goal is to make the aggrieved partly whole.55 Such relief includes 
reinstatement with the same seniority, back pay with interest, and 
compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of 
 
 
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C). 
No [public company] or any officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of such company . . . may discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate 
against an employee . . . because of any lawful act done by the 
employee—(1) to provide information, cause information to be 
provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any 
conduct which the employee reasonably believes constitutes [certain 
enumerated violations] . . . when the information or assistance is 
provided to or the investigation is conducted by—(A) a Federal 
regulatory or law enforcement agency; (B)  any  member  of  
Congress . . . or (C) a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee . . . . 
Id. §§ 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
52. Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(A). Congress delegated the administration of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act whistleblower claims to the Department of Labor, who 
further delegated to the OSHA. See Secretary’s Order 5-2002, Delegation of 
Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Assistant Secretary for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,008 (Oct. 22, 2002) (assigning 
authority of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A to OSHA). 
53.    Id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D). 
54.    Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B). 
55. Id. § 1514A(c)(1). 
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discrimination, such as litigation costs and attorney fees.56 Relief 
does not include recovery of punitive damages that were available 
under some statutes.57 
Many scholars questioned whether the ostensibly broad 
reforms included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were mere rhetoric or 
legislative “silver bullets” that would effect change.58 Many of the 
protections offered have been described as more “illusory than 
real.”59 Despite the additional protections offered to whistleblowers 
under the Act, the percentage of reporters dropped from 18.4% to 
13.2% after its enactment.60 This decrease in reporters has been 
attributed to the unavailability of punitive damages, the short 
statute of limitations, and not being entitled to a jury trial under 
the Act.61 
To respond to shortcomings in financial regulation, Congress 
passed the Dodd-Frank Act. One shortcoming was the SEC’s ability 
to identify securities law violations.62 The Act therefore included 
“a new, robust whistleblower program designed to motivate people 
who know of securities law violations to tell the SEC.”63 Congress 
recognized that whistleblowers often face the difficult choice of 
remaining silent or reporting and committing “career suicide.”64 
Therefore, the new program includes both incentives and 
protections.65 The incentives, which are outside the scope of this 
 
56. Id. § 1514A(2). 
57. Id. §§ 1514A(c)(1)–(2). 
58. Cunningham, supra note 49, at 919. 
59. Deborah L. Seifert et al., The Influence of Organizational Justice on 
Accountant Whistleblowing, 35 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC’Y, 707, 709 (2010). 
60. See Samuel C. Leifer, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the 
Dodd-Frank Act, 113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 128 (2014). 
61. Isaac Halverson, Note, For Whom the Whistle Blows: Who Qualifies as 
a Dodd-Frank Whistleblower?, 18 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 505, 
511 (2018). 
62. Although Congress attempted to fill some gaps left open by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, some scholars have noted that the “piecemeal evolution of 
whistleblower legislation . . . created regulatory and enforcement failures that 
ultimately diminish whistleblower protections, and in turn, thwart corporate 
governance.” Meera Kahn, Comment, Whistling in the Wind: Why Federal 
Whistleblower Protections Fall Short of Their Corporate Governance Goals, 26 
U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 57, 57 (2018). 
63. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 38 (2010). 
64. Id. at 111. 
65. On May 25, 2011, the SEC released a set of finalized rules to 
implement the whistleblower incentives and protections contained in section 
922 of the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
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Survey, include a requirement for the SEC to pay significant 
monetary awards to individuals who provide information to the 
SEC, which leads to a successful enforcement action.66 The 
protections include the creation of a private cause of action for 
certain individuals (including attorneys and employees) against 
corporations. 
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded several protections offered to 
whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by: (1) creating a 
cause of action for all employees, not only those of publicly traded 
companies, to immediately sue in federal court; (2) extending the 
statute of limitations; and (3) increasing the potential remedy 
available. Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act 
does not include an administrative exhaustion requirement or 180- 
day statute of limitations. Instead, a whistleblower may bring a 
private cause of action against a current or former employer 
directly in federal court within six years of the alleged violation.67 
Further, the Dodd-Frank Act extends the remedies available to 
aggrieved employees to include not only back-pay, but also double 
back pay with interest.68 
B. Defining “Whistleblower” Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Dodd-Frank Act 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act expressly extends whistleblower 
protection to any employee of a publically traded company who 
reports misconduct to a federal agency (including the SEC), any 
member of Congress, or anyone with supervisory authority.69 Most 
relevant here, the Act prohibits certain companies from: 
Discriminat[ing] against an employee in the terms and 
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done 
by the employee—(1) to provide information, cause 
information to be provided, or otherwise assist in an 
 
 
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-6(b)(1)(A)–(B) (“[The SEC shall] pay an aggregate 
amount equal to—(A) not less that 10 percent, in total of what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related actions; 
and (B) not more than 30 percent.”). 
67. Id. §§ 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i), (h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)–(II). The default limitation 
period is six years, but in some cases the limitation period may be as long as 
ten years. Id. 
68. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C)(ii). 
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
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investigation regarding any conduct which the employee 
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of [certain 
criminal statutes], any rule or regulation of the [SEC], or 
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against 
shareholders.70 
This protection would apply even if the information is only provided 
internally to a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee.71 
Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Dodd-Frank Act’s anti- 
retaliation provision does not include an express definition of 
whistleblower. Instead, the provision extends protection to any 
individual who makes a disclosure that is “required or protected 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”72 As explained, the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act defines whistleblower as an employee who provides 
information to “a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee.”73 However, the definition section of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, section 21F, includes a definition of whistleblower.74 This 
definition is narrower than the Sarbanes-Oxley definition, as it only 
includes individuals who provide “information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner 
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”75 
Given these varying references to whistleblower under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC believed it was imperative to provide 
guidance. In 2011, the SEC adopted regulations implementing the 
Dodd-Frank Act and provided that for purposes of the anti- 
retaliation provision, SEC reporting is not required.76 The SEC 
 
70. Id. § 1514(a)(1). 
71. Id. § 1514A(a)(1)(C). 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
73. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C). 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
75. The statute states that the definition shall apply to § 78u-6. 
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(i)–(iii). The rule provides that: 
(1) [F]or purposes of the anti-retaliation protections afforded [under 
the Dodd-Frank Act] you are a whistleblower if: 
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are 
providing relates to a possible securities law violation . . . and; 
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in [the Dodd- 
Frank Act]. 
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or not you satisfy 
the requirements, procedures and conditions to qualify for an award. 
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interpreted the statute expansively to not only include protections 
for individuals who report to the SEC, but also to individuals who 
only report to their supervisors. For purposes of the award 
provision, however, the rule requires a whistleblower to report 
suspicions of an alleged securities law violation to the SEC.77 
Some courts, however, declined to follow this SEC regulation. 
This resulted in a circuit split over whether Dodd-Frank’s 
whistleblower protection only extends to employees who internally 
report information to supervisors as implied by the definition in the 
anti-retaliation section, or if whistleblowers must report to the SEC 
to receive protection as required in the definition section. The 
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits resolved these claims in three 
distinct ways. The Second Circuit concluded that because the term 
whistleblower was sufficiently ambiguous, Chevron deference 
should apply to the SEC rule extending protection to internal 
reporters.78 The Ninth Circuit did not defer to the SEC rule, but 
still concluded that protection extends to internal whistleblowers.79 
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language of 
the statute only provides protection to individuals who disclose to 
the SEC.80 
The Supreme Court recently resolved this circuit split and 
unanimously adopted a narrow definition of “whistleblower.”81 In 
Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, the Court held that the Dodd- 
Frank Act only protected individuals who reported securities 
violations directly to the SEC.82 In adopting the narrow definition 
of the Fifth Circuit, the Court relied on: (1) the express definition of 
“whistleblower” under the Act; and (2) the purpose of the Dodd- 
 
Id. 
77. Id. § 240.21F-2(a)(2). 
78. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding 
that the Dodd-Frank Act covers internal reporters because the statute is 
ambiguous and Chevron allows for deference to the SEC’s interpretation of 
whistleblower), abrogated by Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 
(2018). 
79. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017), 
rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018). 
80. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA) LLC., 720 F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that the employee was not protected against retaliation under the 
Dodd-Frank Act because the plain language of the whistleblower provision 
only protects individuals who disclose to the SEC). 
81. See Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 772–73. 
82. Id. 
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Frank Act.83 
The Court held that under a plain reading of this provision, an 
employee is required to provide information to the SEC in order to 
obtain protection against retaliation.84 The Court reasoned that 
the condition must be satisfied because “[c]ourts are not at liberty 
to dispense with the condition—tell the SEC—Congress 
imposed.”85 
Further, Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, in which 
Justice Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined, 
reasoned that this textual reading comports with the legislative 
purpose of the Act.86 The Senate Report stated that the core 
purpose of the robust whistleblower protection is to “motivate 
people who know of securities violations to tell the SEC.”87 To 
achieve that goal, the Court explained, Congress heightened 
protection against retaliation to whistleblowers who provide 
actionable information to the SEC.88 
In the first concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by 
Justices Alito and Gorsuch, disagreed with the majority’s reliance 
on the Senate Report to determine Congress’ intent.89 These 
Justices concurred with the majority opinion to the extent it relied 
on the text of the Dodd-Frank Act itself. They believe that a 
statute’s purpose and interpretation should be derived solely from 
the plain text of the statute.90 
By contrast, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote 
a second concurring opinion only to note their disagreement with 
Justice Thomas’ suggestion that a Senate Report is not an 
appropriate interpretive tool for determining the meaning of a 
statute.91 
II. INTERNAL REPORTING AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
In response to the corporate scandals at the turn of the century, 
 
 
83. Id. at 776–78. 
84.    Id. at 778. 
85.    Id. at 777. 
86. See id. at 777–78. 
87.    Id. at 777. 
88.    Id. at 778. 
89. Id. at 783 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 782 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Congress included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act a requirement that 
public companies establish internal reporting systems for 
employees to report misconduct to management.92 Such reports 
allow corporations to remedy problems internally without negative 
publicity.93 In order to encourage employees to report, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides protection against retaliation to any 
employee who reports misconduct to a supervisor.94 Jane Norberg, 
the chief of the SEC’s Whistleblowing Office, explained that 
protecting internal whistleblowers from retaliation is critical to the 
SEC’s enforcement efforts: “Put simply, if individuals are not 
assured that they will be protected from retaliation if they report 
internally, they will be less likely to report internally, which could 
undermine the important role that internal compliance programs 
play in helping the Commission prevent, detect, and stop securities 
law violations.”95 
One of the arguments made by Somers, the Solicitor General, 
and the SEC in the Digital Realty case was that limiting 
whistleblower status under the Dodd-Frank Act to include only 
individuals who report to the SEC would undermine the protections 
available to auditors, attorneys, and other employees subject to 
internal reporting requirements.96 For example, under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, attorneys who appear or practice before the 
SEC are required to report internally and may later report to the 
SEC only under certain circumstances.97 Specifically, attorneys are 
 
 
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4) (2012) (requiring covered companies to 
establish internal reporting procedures for questionable conduct and for the 
anonymous submission of complaints). 
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012). 
94. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C). 
95. Jane Norberg, Keynote Address, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 386, 
397 (2018). 
96. Brief for Respondent at 35, Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. 767 (No. 16- 
1276); Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
21, Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. 767 (No. 16-1276). 
97. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014). 
An attorney may report a violation externally without the consent of 
the client if the attorney reasonably believes it necessary: 
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation likely 
to cause substantial financial injury to the financial interests or 
property of the issuer or investors; 
(ii) To prevent the issuer . . . from committing any act . . . that is likely 
to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission; or 
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required to report “evidence of a material violation of securities law 
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation” up the ladder to the 
general counsel of the company or the CEO.98 If the response is 
inadequate, the lawyer must disclose it to the audit committee or 
any other committee comprised of independent directors. However, 
an attorney may only ignore ordinary privilege rules and report to 
the SEC under limited circumstances under the SEC rules,99 and 
under even fewer circumstances under some state ethics rules.100 
For instance, the ethics rules in a few jurisdictions limit an 
attorney’s ability to make external reports of some financial crimes 
or non-criminal frauds.101 Accordingly, an attorney who 
improperly reports a violation may be at risk of professional 
disciplinary investigation or action for violating the privilege.102 
The SEC and some scholars have claimed that rules 
encouraging attorney disclosure under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or 
Dodd-Frank Act should preempt state ethics rules.103 However, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Id. 
 
 
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material violation by the issuer 
that caused . . . substantial injury to the financial interest property of 
the issuer or investors in furtherance of which the attorney’s services 
were used or illegal act in which the attorney’s services have been 
used. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. See also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys (Final Rule), Securities Act Release No. 33-8185, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-47276 (Jan. 29, 2003). Section 205 applies to attorneys 
appearing and practicing before the SEC, which is broadly defined to include 
merely advising on a securities law issue that the lawyer has notice will be 
incorporated in a document filed with the SEC. 
100. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Stitches for Snitches: Lawyers as 
Whistleblowers, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1455, 1548 (2017) (providing a state-by- 
state chart of ethics rules). 
101. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2018) (permitting 
attorneys to reveal confidential client information only when necessary to 
prevent a criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodily injury). 
102. Naseem Faqihi, Choosing Which Law to Break First: An In-House 
Attorney Whistleblower’s Choices After Discovering a Possible Federal 
Securities Law Violation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3341, 3341 (2014) (proposing 
that in-house attorneys should be permitted to report federal securities 
violations externally if their internal report does not resolve the violation). 
103. See Pacella, supra note 16, at 527–45 (proposing amendments to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to clarify when external reporting is permissible, and 
modifications to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 to allow attorneys to 
externally report misconduct). 
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several scholars104 and respected state bar associations, including 
Washington, California, and New York disagree with this 
approach.105 These states question the SEC’s preemption rule, 
which provides that an attorney who makes a report to the SEC in 
good faith, under circumstances permitted by the SEC but not 
applicable state law “shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise 
liable under inconsistent standards.”106 For example, the 
Washington State Bar Association issued an interim opinion 
disagreeing with the SEC’s claim that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
preempted state ethics rules.107 The SEC responded with a 
comment letter explaining that the Supreme Court has consistently 
“upheld the authority of federal agencies to implement rules of 
conduct that diverge from and supersede state laws that address 
the same conduct.”108 Despite this comment letter, the bar 
association adopted the interim opinion.109 The preemption issue 
has not been decided by the courts and many attorneys may not be 
willing to take the risk of disciplinary action when deciding whether 
to report their client’s misconduct.110 
The Solicitor General argued that the narrow definition of 
 
 
104. See, e.g., Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovitz, Lawyers as 
Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act: Ethical 
Conflicts Under the Rules of Professional Conduct and SEC Rules, 84 NYSBA 
J. 10, 19 (July/Aug. 2012) (“It feels disquieting, and is perhaps 
unconstitutional, for the federal government to arrogate itself the power to 
purport to regulate state attorney ethics.”). 
105. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 100. 
106. 17 C.F.R. § 205.6(c) (2003). 
107. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 100. 
108. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, SEC Gen. Counsel, to J. Richard 
Manning, President, Wash. State Bar Ass’n, and David W. Savage, President- 
Elect, Wash. State Bar Ass’n (July 23, 2003) (available at 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm) [https://perma.cc/5RGM- 
U3TX]. 
109. See Ventry, Jr., supra note 100. 
110. Lawrence A. West, Eric R. Swibel & Jenny Allen, Will Award-Seeking 
Whistleblower Lawyers Be Caught Between Conflicting SEC and State Ethics 
Rules?, LATHAM     &    WATKINS    LITIG.   DEP’T 1, 6 (Oct. 21, 2013), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblower-ethics-conflict 
[https://perma.cc/N3TW-C5NZ] (demonstrating that lawyers who report 
wrongdoing to the SEC may be subject to discipline for breaching the attorney- 
client privilege under inconsistent state ethics standards); see also Swidler & 
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (limiting the ability of the federal 
government to interfere with attorney-client confidential communications, 
protected by state law). 
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whistleblower would leave attorneys and other employees 
“vulnerable to discharge or other retaliatory action for complying 
with” their reporting obligations.111 The Court responded to this 
argument by explaining that even under the narrow definition, the 
individual would be protected against retaliation as soon as he or 
she also discloses the information to the SEC.112 Although the 
individual would not be protected if the retaliation occurs before the 
attorney has a chance to report to the SEC, the Court reasoned that 
such a result is consistent with the legislative intent to encourage 
SEC disclosure.113 Also, such an individual would still be protected 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other anti-retaliation statutes.114 
The Digital Realty holding deprives attorney whistleblowers 
who comply with their reporting obligations under the Sarbanes- 
Oxley Act by reporting up the ladder, but not disclosing confidential 
information to the SEC, from any recourse for retaliation under the 
Dodd-Frank Act. Although, as the Court mentions, attorneys may 
have recourse under state tort law and other federal statutes, these 
sources provide relatively weak remedies and have proven 
ineffective at offering adequate protection.115 For example, 
whistleblowers seeking protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
would need to file within shorter statutory periods and would have 
restrictions on where they can bring their claim.116 
This leaves lawyers subject to the attorney-client privilege in a 
precarious situation. They can either forego the additional 
protections available under the Dodd-Frank Act or they can report 
violations to the SEC and possibly subject themselves to state 
disciplinary action for breaching their duty of confidentiality.117 
The concerns are even worse for in-house counsel who depend on a 
 
 
111. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
21, Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018) (No. 16-1276). 
112. Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 780. 
113. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 111-176 at 38). 
114. Id. (citing Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 468–69 (2014)). 
115. Pacella, supra note 16, at 492–93. 
116. To the extent that state ethics rules require reporting to supervisors 
and supervisors fail to take action, it may be impossible to comply with the 
180-day filing requirement, and in any event the lawyer would have much less 
than 180 days to file the complaint. 
117. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (2007) (explaining that the duty of 
confidentiality is much broader than the attorney-client privilege). 
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single client for their livelihood.118 This may lead to less reporting 
and undermine one of Congress’ mandates in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act—that attorneys report up the corporate ladder “evidence of a 
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or 
similar violation.”119 It would also undermine the Dodd-Frank Act 
which incorporated this reporting mandate. 
Further, the narrow interpretation of whistleblower may 
incentivize corporations to terminate attorneys before they can 
report to the SEC. Lawyers are therefore uniquely vulnerable to 
retaliation between the time he or she internally reports 
misconduct and his or her determination that he or she may report 
externally to the SEC. After the lawyer is terminated it is unlikely 
that the lawyer can report to the wrongdoing without violating his 
or her duty of confidentiality.120 
There are similar problems with respect to employees who do 
not have internal reporting obligations. Since the Court’s decision 
does not extend whistleblower protection to employees who only 
internally report, it may encourage employees to bypass corporate 
internal reporting procedures and go directly to the SEC.121 
Although the Court suggests that this may be the outcome that 
Congress intended, the holding may have some unintended 
consequences. If employees report directly to the SEC, it will 
circumvent the corporation’s internal controls.122 It will also 
impact an employer’s ability to internally resolve the problem 
without government involvement, or to self-report to the SEC and 
obtain credit for such disclosure.123 Fewer internal reports to 
 
118. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Resituating the Inside Counsel 
as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1005 (2005) (explaining the 
importance of retaliation protection for in house attorneys). A terminated in- 
house attorney loses his or her entire income, insurance, pension, and stock 
options. 
119. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 
68 Fed. Reg. 6296-01 (Feb. 6, 2003) (Release Nos. 33–8185; 34–47276). 
120. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(C) (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983) (“A 
lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter . . . shall not 
thereafter: (1) use information relating to the representation to the 
disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require 
with respect to a client ”); see generally Sarah C. Haan, Whistling Loud 
and Clear: Applying Chevron to Subsection 21F of Dodd-Frank, 75 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 565 (2018). 
121. See generally Halverson, supra note 61. 
122. Hann, supra note 119, at 571. 
123. Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: 
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management may also delay corrective action.124 Further, internal 
reporting has the benefit of avoiding negative publicity, promoting 
employee loyalty, and maintaining the chain of command.125 
In addition to the potential harm to a corporation caused by 
employees bypassing internal reporting procedures, there are also 
risks to the government. The decision may lead to over-reporting 
to the SEC of meritless claims which were previously screened out 
by internal compliance programs. Rather than corporations using 
their own resources to investigate potential wrongdoing in the first 
instance, external reporting will result in the government 
conducting more burdensome and costly investigations which could 
drain their limited resources. The SEC has recognized that a 
possible effect is “an overflow of noisy signals—that is, a large 
number of tips of varying quality—causing the Commission to incur 
costs to process and validate the information.”126 Internal 
reporting has the potential to allow corporations to remedy 
misconduct without draining government resources.127 
Despite the concerns that the Digital Realty holding may 
undermine some corporate compliance programs, corporations 
should continue to ensure that they have a culture and process 
which encourages internal reporting. Such internal reports 
minimize the risk of damaging government investigations and 
increases the chances that the corporation will receive cooperation 
credit from the government. 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
 
Defending a More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CAL. L. 
REV. 1633, 1634 (2008) (proposing that states adopt a more flexible approach 
that would protect internal and external reporters so long as the employee 
believed that the recipient could correct the misconduct). 
124. Ronald H. Filler & Jerry W. Markham, Whistleblowers – A Case Study 
in the Regulatory Cycle for Financial Services, BROOKLYN J. COR. FIN. & COMM. 
L. 311, 318 (2018). 
125. Id. 
126. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of 
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 75 Fed. Reg. 70, 4888, 
70,516 (Nov. 17, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) (discussing the 
purpose of a reporting grace period of ninety days for the whistleblower award 
program). 
127. See Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719, 733 (D. Neb. 
2014). 
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Inc., the Supreme Court held that when a statute is ambiguous and 
the SEC’s interpretation is reasonable, courts are required to give 
deference to the agency construction.128 Before Chevron, deference 
was only mandatory when Congress explicitly delegated 
interpretative authority to the agency.129 Rather than limiting 
deference in this way, the Court established a two–step test to 
determine when judicial deference to an agency construction of a 
statute is required: 
First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply 
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.130 
The Chevron Court reasoned that when there is an express or 
implied delegation of power from Congress to an agency to fill a gap 
in a statute, the agency is authorized to clarify the provisions in the 
statute through regulation.131 If the agency creates a rule, under 
an express delegation, the rule should be adjudged a “permissible 
construction of the statute” so long as it is not “arbitrary, capricious 
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”132 However, if the agency 
acts under implied delegation, the rule should be adjudged a 
permissible construction if it is reasonable in light of the enabling 
legislation.133 
The rationale behind the Chevron doctrine is that ambiguities 
 
128. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (stating that an agency’s interpretation of 
a statute was entitled to mandatory deference even though it was not 
promulgated under an explicit delegation of authority). 
129. See id. at 843–44. 
130. Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted). 
131. Id. at 843–44. 
132.  Id. at 844. 
133.    Id. at 844–45. 
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in statutes within an agency’s jurisdiction to administer are implied 
delegations of authority to fill the statutory gap in a reasonable 
manner; filling these gaps, as the Court explained, involves difficult 
policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make than 
courts.134 Between the two, agencies possess greater subject 
matter expertise and better understand policies implicated along 
with potential consequences of alternative resolutions to statutory 
ambiguities.135 
In Digital Realty, Somers and the Solicitor General argued that 
the term “whistleblower” in the anti-retaliation section of the Dodd- 
Frank Act was ambiguous and the SEC rule defining whistleblower 
should apply under the Chevron doctrine.136 The Dodd-Frank Act’s 
definition section, section 21F, defined whistleblower as “any 
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of 
the securities laws to the Commission.”137 However, the anti- 
retaliation section expressly provides protection against retaliation 
when an individual makes “disclosures that are required or 
protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”138 The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act protects both internal and external whistleblowers.139 
Accordingly, Somers and the Solicitor General argued that the term 
“whistleblower” is ambiguous and the Court should afford deference 
to the SEC interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.140 The SEC 
rule provides that the term “whistleblower” for purposes of the anti- 
retaliation provision of the Dodd-Frank Act includes employees who 
only make internal reports of misconduct.141 Finding this 
argument unpersuasive, the Court held that Dodd-Frank’s 
definition of whistleblower was unambiguous and precluded the 
SEC from more expansively defining that term.142 This meant that 
the Court was able to set aside the agency interpretation without 
disturbing the holding in Chevron. 
Although the Court did not question the constitutionality of the 
Chevron doctrine, such an inquiry was suggested in defendant’s 
 
134. Id. at 865–66. 
135. Id. (emphasizing that judges are not experts in every field). 
136. See Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 776 (2018). 
137. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012). 
138. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). 
140. Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 776. 
141. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2(b)(i)–(iii) (2013). 
142. Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. at 781–82. 
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reply brief. In its brief, Digital Realty argued that if the Court 
concluded that the statutory text was ambiguous and deference 
should be given to the SEC rule, it should “order supplemental 
briefing to consider whether Chevron should be overruled.”143 
Digital Realty was inviting the Court to reconsider a three-decade- 
old basic premise of administrative law. 
If the Court had reconsidered the Chevron decision as 
suggested by Digital Realty, it appears that at least two justices 
may have concluded that the doctrine is unconstitutional. While 
sitting on the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote powerfully about how Chevron is an 
unconstitutional abdication of judicial and congressional power 
under the separation of powers doctrine.144 Similarly, Justice 
Thomas in Michigan v. EPA, expressed concern that Chevron 
deference vests the executive branch with power the Constitution 
has granted only to Congress.145 Although Chief Justice Roberts is 
not as extreme, he has advocated for a narrower, context-specific, 
expertise-driven application of the doctrine.146 In King v. Burwell, 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, adopted a “Step 
Zero” exception to the Chevron doctrine.147 The Court held that 
Chevron deference was not applicable to certain major questions 
without a clear congressional intent to delegate beyond just mere 
ambiguity in the text.148 In a concurring opinion in Pereira v. 
 
143. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 22 n.3, Dig. Realty Tr., 138 S. Ct. 767 
(No. 16-1276). 
144. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch published both the majority opinion 
and a concurrence in the same case; in his concurrence, he criticized the 
doctrine as a “goliath of modern administrative law” that is “more than a little 
difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.” Id. at 1149, 
1158. 
145. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Statutory 
ambiguity thus becomes an implicit delegation of rule-making authority, and 
that authority is used not to find the best meaning of the text, but to formulate 
legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on policy judgments made by the 
agency.”). 
146. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 321–22 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“An agency interpretation warrants such deference only if 
Congress has delegated authority to definitively interpret a particular 
ambiguity in a particular manner.”). 
147. See 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015). 
148. Id. The Court in King refused to give deference to the IRS’ 
interpretation of the availability of tax credits under the Affordable Care Act 
because the question was one of “deep ‘economic and political significance’” that 
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Sessions, Justice Kennedy noted the concerns raised by some 
members of the Court and explained that “it seems necessary and 
appropriate to reconsider . . . the premises that underlie Chevron 
and how courts have implemented that decision.”149 
The Supreme Court did not use the Digital Realty case as an 
opportunity to re-consider the scope of the Chevron doctrine. 
However, the holding demonstrates that courts can narrow the 
application of the doctrine by concluding that the text of the statute 
is not ambiguous. In Pereira v. Sessions, decided a few months after 
Digital Realty, the Court again concluded that a term was 
unambiguous.150 The Court reached this conclusion despite the 
fact that it went through eight pages to explain the statute’s plain- 
text meaning, and it disagreed with six appellate courts and the 
responsible agency over whether the term was ambiguous.151 In 
his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito criticized the Court for ignoring 
Chevron and refusing to accord deference to the agency 
interpretation.152 As he explained, “unless the Court has overruled 
Chevron in a secret decision that has somehow escaped my 
attention, it remains good law” and should be followed or openly 
reexamined.153 He also expressed concern that the doctrine that 
was once “celebrated” has been “increasingly maligned.”154 Digital 
 
is central to this statutory scheme, and Congress did not expressly delegate 
that question to the IRS to consider. Id. at 2489 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory 
Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). Also, the Court found that it was 
unlikely that Congress would have delegated a major question to an agency 
with no expertise in the subject matter. Id. (“It is especially unlikely that 
Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise 
in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.”). Scholars have questioned 
whether this exception “has staying power to narrow Chevron’s domain, or 
whether it was just a one-off application based on extraordinary 
circumstances.” Christopher Walker, Toward a Context-Specific Chevron 
Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1095, 1102 (2016). 
149. 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the 
issuance of notice requirement in a federal immigration statute that does not 
state a time and place for removal hearing, but states that a hearing will be 
held at a time and place to be later specified, is not ambiguous and the BIA 
interpretation was not entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine). 
150. Id. at 2113 (majority opinion). 
151. Id. at 2120 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
152. Id. at 2121 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[A] straightforward application of 
Chevron requires us to accept the Government’s construction . . . I can only 
conclude that the Court is simply ignoring Chevron.”). 
153.    Id. at 2129. 
154.    Id. at 2121. 
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Realty, Pereira, and several other recent decisions may be signposts 
that the Court is waiting for a good case to reexamine Chevron 
deference.155 
Although the SEC rule defining whistleblower was not entitled 
to deference, scholars have suggested that the SEC may be able to 
protect internal whistleblowers by exempting individuals from 
external reporting requirements.156 Congress explicitly granted 
the SEC general authority to exempt any class or person from 
Dodd-Frank requirements.157 It is unclear whether the Court 
would give deference to such an exemption under the Chevron 
doctrine since it has already decided that the definition of 
whistleblower is unambiguous.158 However, some lower courts and 
the Third Circuit have concluded that an agency may exercise its 
exemptive authority even if a statute is clear because, in granting 
agencies broad exemptive power, Congress intended to provide 
them the ability to deal with unforeseeable problems that may arise 
under the statutes.159 
CONCLUSION 
Whistleblowers protect corporations, shareholders, and society 
at large by preventing or reducing corporate wrongdoing and 
forcing information up the ladder or into the public domain. 
However, whistleblowers such as Paul Somers, Sherron Watkins, 
and Cynthia Cooper subject themselves to devastating 
consequences for reporting suspicions of misconduct. Recognizing 
 
155. Several recent cases seem to suggest the Court’s willingness to 
reconsider Chevron. For example, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court 
mentioned that “[n]o party to these cases has asked us to reconsider Chevron,” 
which suggests that such a request may have been considered. See 138 S. Ct. 
1612, 1629 (2018) (holding that Chevron does not apply where two federal 
agencies formally disagree over statute’s meaning). 
156. Lesley Chen, Comment, The SEC’s Forgotten Power of Exemption: How 
the SEC Can Receive Deference in Favor of Internal Whistleblowers Even When 
the Text is Clear, 67 EMORY L. J. 1043, 1049 (2018). 
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2012). 
158. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
159. See AARP v. Equal Emp’t Opp. Comm’n, 489 F.3d 558, 565 (3d Cir. 
2007) (holding that the EEOC may exercise its exemptive authority even if 
there is no ambiguity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); see also 
Kornfeld v. Eaton, 217 F. Supp. 671, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding that the SEC 
exempts long-term profits realized by officers and major stockholders by 
exercise of an option from forfeiture to their corporation because Congress 
explicitly granted them this exemptive authority). 
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that these whistleblowers deserve protection and existing federal, 
state. and local law was inadequate, Congress adopted the anti- 
retaliation provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The Dodd-Frank Act expanded several of the protections 
available to whistleblowers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and prior 
federal statutes, such as the ability to bring a cause of action 
directly into federal court and to recover more than compensatory 
damages. In determining which reporters would be considered 
whistleblowers under the anti-retaliation section of the Act, the 
Digital Realty Court relied on a plain reading approach and applied 
the definition of whistleblower provided in the definition section of 
the Act. The definition of whistleblower was narrow and only 
included individuals who reported to the SEC—reporters unlike 
Paul Somers. The Court explained that the plain meaning 
approach comports with the legislative intent of the Act—to 
encourage individuals to report directly to the SEC. Since the Court 
concluded that the statute was clear and unambiguous, it did not 
defer to the SEC rule defining whistleblower more expansively. 
Although the narrow definition of whistleblower may encourage 
external reporting, the decision may have some unintended 
consequences on corporate compliance programs, forum shopping, 
and the strength of the Chevron doctrine. 
